In October last year, I was invited to speak before a World Bank forum to mark the observance of International Disaster Risk Reduction Day. Makati had just been chosen by the World Bank as one of East Asia’s Climate Resilient Cities, and particular mention was made about the city’s high state of disaster preparedness. I was asked to share how Makati was able to go beyond mere advocacy and take concrete steps in the fight against climate change, and our readiness to respond to natural disasters which have become more frequent, more devastating in the past few years.

As the country’s financial center, Makati is particularly vulnerable to climate change. We have a daytime population of almost four million – composed of 500,000 residents and over three million office employees, businessmen and visitors confined in an area of 21.36 square kilometers. On the city’s streets, about 400,000 motor vehicles, many of which fail global emission standards, can be found daily.

With such huge concentration of people and vehicles at certain periods of the day, greenhouse gas emission is high. Strong typhoons also impact on the city, since massive flooding and prolonged power outages disrupt business activities, affecting both the local and national economy.

To mitigate the effects of climate change, Makati has taken proactive steps which have been recognized by the World Bank. These include promoting waste segregation and recycling in schools, barangays and the business district; imposing penalties on smoking in public areas, and going after smoke-belching vehicles.

As a result, for the period 2003-2007, Makati was able to bring down the volume of waste by 33 percent, preventing the emission of 260,000 tons of equivalent carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.

In 2008 we also introduced electric jeepneys or e-jeepneys to the commuters of the city, one of the first local governments to do so. And this week, we will inaugurate “green routes” in the Makati CBD, with 10 e-jeepneys – fueled by electricity with zero emission – offering free rides to office employees and residents along these green routes.

I also told the World Bank forum that the readiness of local governments to respond to disasters should go beyond having the right equipment, the right manpower and preparing communities.

Through scientific studies and – unfortunately – through actual experience, we have been made aware of the connection between climate change and disasters. At that time, the Philippines and the rest of East Asia were being battered by strong typhoons and killer floods.

A year after that speech, Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon would be devastated by two typhoons, “Ondoy” and “Pepeng.” While Makati was not spared the deluge, we were able to keep damages to lives and properties at a minimum. In fact, Makati was up and running the following day, and people and businesses resumed their regular activities. We attributed this to the pro-active steps we have taken through the years, both in policies and programs to mitigate climate change and our investments in disaster preparedness. Unfortunately, the rest of the National Capital Region and the nearby provinces were not similarly situated, prompting the city government to deploy our rescue personnel and equipment to heavily damaged localities, and send relief aid to affected communities.

The end result of these two typhoons underscored what I told the World Bank – that all natural disasters impact on local economies first, and on the national economy when it affects a large area. When they occur in large intensities, they displace lives, homes, business and economic activities.

Climate change is a reality. It is a reality in the lives of people in areas where the effects of climate change go far beyond mere inconveniences brought about by a sudden downpour or a drop in temperature. Climate change poses a direct threat to their lives, to their livelihood, to the safety of their homes, to the stability of their communities.

Natural disasters also stretch the capacity of local governments to respond to the immediate aftermath of disasters and to manage the humanitarian crisis that follows.

When local economies are disrupted, the capacity of local governments to provide services for their people during normal times is also disrupted. The capacity of local governments to care for the poor, the sick, the children and the elderly as a matter of regular social service is severely compromised.

This is most especially true in the case of small local governments with limited resources. And this has been an urgent concern, considering the large number of people who live in poverty. The need therefore to address climate change takes on social dimensions, as they also impact on a locality’s human and social investments, which in turn, would impact on the locality’s future stability.

But a recognition of the important role of local governments would also necessitate a recognition of the dynamics of the relation between local governments and the national government. As it is now, most local governments remain dependent on the national government, especially when responding to disasters and natural emergencies.

Local governments are in the best position to respond immediately to disasters, yet the effectiveness and efficiency of their response, to a large part, is dictated by how fast or how slow the national government reacts to these disasters.

When the national government is slow to respond to major calamities, local governments — and the citizens that have been displaced – suffer the most.

The NDCC structure needs review

If you look at the way the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) is structured, the breakdown in national government response was a loaded gun simply looking for a trigger.

Had the NDCC been better organized and had there been clearer roles for players at all levels of governance, whatever resources were available could have been more quickly dispatched to those who need them the most.

Based on its structure, the NDCC is headed by the Defense Secretary. From the national down to the regional level, it is inter-agency or inter-departmental in nature, with leadership being provided or exercised by the heads of agency. From the provincial level down to the barangay level, the disaster coordinating councils are headed by local executives.

These are the frontline agents for disaster response. If only to reflect the vital role of local governments and to streamline the structure, it would have been logical for the NDCC to be chaired by the Local Government and Interior Secretary.

There are also other problems with such a structure that may have created a disjoint in coordination and communication. When the structure was tested to the extreme by “Ondoy” and then “Pepeng,” it hampered the capability of national agencies and local government units to work together more effectively.

First off, there is no organizational line that runs straight from the national to the barangay level and vice-versa to ensure coordination and communication at all levels. In the NDCC organizational diagram, the “red line” is cut at the level of the RDCC, indicating that from this point on, coordination and communication is only on a “for your information” basis. This means that organs down the line may or may not respond with dispatch. Again, putting the DILG secretary on top of the NDCC would be logical, since he exercises supervision over local governments.

Second, the heads of agency are Cabinet members. This is well and good as this ensures access to resources for particular agencies. But it could also give rise to a constriction in the flow of such resources as agency heads assert control of resources if only to assert political control. Or they could follow Mrs. Arroyo’s example in micromanagement, a factor that, however, could find resistance in a third issue: that from the provincial level down, local disaster councils are led by elective officials who belong to political parties. This could prevent local officials from accessing national government resources should they be perceived as “enemies.” For local governments who have little Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to spare for disaster risk management, much less, pay salaries for their employees, this would indeed be a disadvantage.

Scapegoats

When needed, Malacañang finds it convenient and politically expedient to use local governments as scapegoats. This was on display barely a few days after “Ondoy” when administration officials began blaming local officials in its clumsy attempt to contain public outrage over national government’s failure to respond to the typhoon’s aftermath.

The reality is that national government also needs to be made accountable for its apparent failure to institute a reliable flood control program, its failure to properly dispose Metro Manila’s garbage, and its failure to subject to rigorous review all applications for environmental permits from property developers.

For example, while local governments are responsible for collecting and segregating garbage, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is responsible for hauling and disposing Metro Manila’s garbage.

National government agencies are responsible for issuing environmental clearances and permits to property developers. The presence of property developments on top of waterways has been pinpointed as contributing to the massive flooding in Metro Manila. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are preconditions before a local government entertains applications for property developments. These EIAs serve as the first line of defense in determining if private sector projects will be blocking waterways and will affect the immediate environment.

The national government is in a better position to see the larger environmental impact of these projects beyond the confines of a locality, and their assessments on the environment impact of property developments are crucial. If the DENR issues EIAs for these projects, the local government then reviews project applications based on its local zoning regulations.

Challenge to the next leaders

The failure of the national government to respond immediately, decisively and effectively to the crises wrought by Typhoons “Ondoy” and “Pepeng” was less due to a lack of resources, although one could say that there would have been more resources if not for huge losses to corruption. It has its roots in the overly centralized nature of government.

While several functions and responsibilities have been devolved to local governments since 1991, and with even Mrs. Arroyo insisting that local governments should – correctly – play a major role in disaster response, the reality is that local governments remain hobbled by lack of access to funds and over-dependence on funds from the national government – a set up which Malacanang exploits to the hilt for political purposes.

It is, therefore, a challenge to the next administration, and a test of commitment to public service for potential national leaders: Will they be willing to surrender control over local governments, or will they continue the politically beneficial policy of keeping localities dependent on the national government, a policy that has kept the current administration politically afloat, but has proven to be detrimental to the interests and welfare of citizens who rely on their local governments as their first line of response in emergencies?