Yes, "victory has many fathers and defeat is an orphan”. The current news of the world is the tragic hostage event which happened in front of the Quirino grandstand at the Luneta in Manila. It would seem that almost all of the officials who were in charge or at least supposed to be in charge have not surfaced even reluctantly. Fortunately PNP Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Magtibay Director of the Manila Police District (MPD) has now assumed full responsibility. He offered to go on indefinite leave pending the result of the investigation of the incident. Director Leonardo Santiago Chief of the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) announced the relief of Superintendent Magtibay. My reliable sources informed me that there were many PNP units that were in the vicinity of the hostage area of operations. One unit was the Special Action Force (SAF) of the PNP who are adequately trained and equipped for precisely such a situation. Unfortunately it would seem that under PNP SOP?...the unit that acts on an event is the one that has the jurisdiction. In this case it was the MPD. I was also told that most units of the PNP are also authorized to have their own Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) force. The unit that assaulted the bus was the MPD SWAT. I also understand that practically most of the PNP brass were in the vicinity or at least were in contact with each other.

What is unclear to me is the level of command, control, communication, coordination etc.

I have seen documentaries about rescues like the Israeli Commando’s operation at Entebbe, Uganda where the Colonel in Command died in action. If I recall correctly, except for one, all the hostages were saved and brought back to Israel. I also saw the actual film about the rescue by French Special Forces of hostages in an Air France plane in Paris which was also very successful considering the very difficult circumstances. Likewise I happened to be in Munich, Germany during the Olympics, which resulted in the death of all of at least half a dozen Israeli hostages inspite of the heroic efforts of the German Police. During Martial Law our Special Forces rescued passengers of a hijacked PAL plane at the Manila International Airport (MIA). Most of the hostages survived while some were killed.

What am I driving at? Simply this, that the operation in a hostage situation can go wrong inspite of the rigid training of personnel, inspite of the use of the most appropriate equipment ie stun grenades, gas, gas masks, night vision goggles, radios, where every member of the force is equipped to communicate with each other and so forth etc. And do not forget the use of skilled negotiators. As many of us know part of the methodology is to keep the hostage taker calm and in constant communication. The protocol rescue action is reached when the hostage taker starts killing the hostages. However if the person responsible for the action believes that talking would be useless as in Entebbe, a surprise attack would be in order.

At the end of the day many things could go wrong in such a hazardous hostage situation inspite of the most ideal tactics, weapons, training, intelligence and so forth. So, let’s quit this blame game and instead concentrate on what should be done further on a future incident which we hope will never happen again! .....rene.espina@hotmail.com