(First of Two Parts)

“War is not an option.  Don’t sink our ship...”  — FVR, 17 Aug 2008
 
MANILA, Philippines — War against the MILF and NDF-NPA is not an option. Enduring peace and inclusive, sustainable development – through our unity of purpose, solidarity in values, and teamwork in nation-building – must be the triumphal outcome of today’s collective efforts, as in earlier years.

But, we also say: “Okay for all-out war for justice, all-out war against poverty/deprivation, all-out war against corruption and incompetence, all-out war against organized crime.”

For leaders of our 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution one generation ago, elected incumbents, and today’s family heads, plus concerned Filipinos who assume governance responsibilities after 2013 and 2016 (election years), the above-cited exhortation is the overwhelming sentiment.

Raging debates among the P.Noy Government, MILF, and civil society as reported by media and foreign observers, make it timely indeed to review what had transpired before in order to regroup the entire Filipino Family. All of us on board our one and only Ship “Pilipinas” (including national/local officials, OFWs, dual citizens, foreign locators, and the unborn) need to move faster forward to a better Philippine future.

Let us plug the holes in our leaky, slow boat – not put in new ones. Unfortunately, some war-freaks who have never experienced hostile combat situations or prolonged suffering are among those who always want “bang-bang-bang” – just like in the movies.

Justice is inclusive

Muslim scholars emphasize that “the Qur’an, taken as a whole, gives messages of hope, faith, and peace... to be found through faith in God and justice among fellow humans.”

Says Isaiah (32:17) in the Bible: “Because everyone works for justice, there will be peace and security forever.” This prophecy was the lead topic in our Bulletin column of 25 November 2007.

There we opined: “The GRP-MILF and the GRP-NDF agreements are within reach – if only clear focus, dedicated implementation (of agreed programs), and consistent political will are applied upon the remaining issues by the principals. Ultimately, the GRP, at all levels down to the barangays – under the overall supervision of the President/Commander-in-Chief – carries the burden of responsibility to insure that the final outcomes are enduring peace and sustainable development – not just of affected areas – but Philippines-wide.”

The mobilization of the support of civil society and ordinary people is undeniably the GRP’s mandate and not to be relegated to foreign entities.

Effective ceasefire (July, 1997-April, 2000)

Let us recall that immediately after the Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF on 02 September 1996, FVR tasked then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres to meet with MILF Vice-Chair Ghazali Jaafar to start peace negotiations.

Within a week (on 10 September), Torres and Jaafar agreed to the creation of a Joint Committee to prepare a ceasefire and favorable conditions for negotiations. Meantime, FVR designated Ambassador Fortunato Abat as GRP Panel Chair to work with MILF counterparts.

On 18 July 1997 in Cagayan de Oro, the GRP and MILF Panels signed the “Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities” (in effect, a ceasefire, that lasted for the next 30 months). On 06 February 1998, the “Agreement to Sustain the Quest for Peace” was forged in Marawi by Technical Committee Chairpersons (GRP-ASec Jovenal Lazaga and MILF-Shiekh Moner Bajunaid) and the “Cessation of Hostilities” Sub-Committees (GRP-MGen Joselin Nazareno and MILF-Omar Umpar). Both parties agreed on: (1) repositioning GRP forces in Buldon, Maguindanao; (2) resolution of watershed issues involving the Minabay-Banganan-Ambal Rivers; (3) suspension of logging by Cotabato Timber Company and others; and (4) formation of joint Quick Response Teams.

Perseverance on both sides resulted in significant reductions of hostilities and, therefore, casualties/dislocation/collateral damage throughout Mindanao.

Ceasefire/peace dividends

The 30 precious ceasefire months spurred Mindanao’s development and the blossoming of the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area.

Upon assumption in July, 1997, of Lieutenant General Orlando Soriano, former CG, PA, then Head, National Irrigation Administration, as GRP Panel Chair to replace Ambassador Abat (who assumed higher duties), community development started in MILF enclaves at the Maguindanao-Lanao Sur-Cotabato tri-border.

To our pleasant surprise, Soriano soon asked clearance to undertake three projects: (1) installing potable water systems for Camp Abubakar, using solarpower; (2) irrigating 2,500 hectares of farmland around Abubakar from the Malmar System (then 90% finished); and  (3) concreting the 15-km. road to Abubakar from the highway between Cotabato City and Malabang, Lanao Sur.

Initially requested by Chairman Salamat, FVR quickly approved these projects and released p100 million therefor. The entry of AFP Engineers reinforced by civilians to work inside Camp Abubakar with MILF cooperation (while AFP-PNP units controlled surrounding areas) resembled the “Trojan Horse” situation in military strategy – which substantially improved chances of success towards final agreement.

This was the non-violent breakthrough both sides hoped for. Unfortunately, the favorable situation didn’t last because of President Estrada’s “All-Out War Policy” in April, 2000.

The shattered peace

Alas, the prolonged 30-month ceasefire did not endure. The AFP-PNP and MILF are still fighting today.

The expanding environment of peace was tragically shattered by Estrada’s ill-conceived order in late April 2000 to attack Camp Abubakar – during which mosques were destroyed, MILF mujahideens escaped to fight from other sanctuaries, and thousands of families fled to avoid the crossfire.

Media reports made much of Estrada’s angry temper during late April, 2000, starting with his 63rd birthday on 19 April. What should have been a joyful period turned into a bitter pill with the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping on 23 April of foreign tourists in Sipadan, Sabah, and their transfer to Basilan. This sudden blow was compounded by the tragic crash – three days before – of an Air Philippines airliner near Davao City where all 131 persons aboard perished.

Evidencing Erap’s vengeful mood were his celebrations of Abubakar’s fall with truckloads of “lechon” and beer for the “victorious” troops. Such mindless desecration of Muslim sensitivities was resented by the MILF as intensely as the Abubakar devastation, including the destruction of water systems (operationalized August, 1997) and irrigation networks.

Confidence-building measures attained thru cooperative efforts between GRP Chairman Soriano and MILF Chairman Salamat were wasted.

Recognition of MILF camps

Frequently circulated by Estrada drumbeaters is the alleged “recognition” of MILF main camps by the Ramos Administration – which misinformed people believe to this day. The official record, however, proves the contrary.

The plain truth is that during Erap’s time, on 10 February 1999, Camps Abubakar and Busrah were acknowledged as MILF Camps (First Joint Acknowledgment); and on 06 October 1999, Camps Bilal in Lanao Sur, Rajamuda in Cotabato/Maguindanao; Darapanan/Usama,  Al-Khattab, and Badre – all in Maguindanao – were further recognized as MILF Camps (Second Joint Acknowledgment).

Historical distortions still occasionally appear in media and op-ed articles, obviously to justify – albeit wrongly – Estrada’s war policy that torpedoed not only the prospects of a final peace settlement, but also Mindanao’s sustainable development.

Mindanao war costs

Statistics presented during the Cabinet-OPAPP briefing for Congressional leaders last 04 August 2008 showed that during 1970-1996, the AFP spent some P73 billion for arms/ammunition against the MNLF and its splinter groups (MILF included) – on top of loss of lives and socio-economic costs.

Estrada’s “All-Out War Policy” launched April, 2000, resulted in an average of P20 million spent daily for three months (total P1.8 billion). Despite heavy spending, that offensive cost the lives of 431 soldiers and 624 wounded. Moreover, infrastructure damage amounted to P202 million, plus P125 million worth of agri-products destroyed.

In 2003, when measurable progress restarted in Mindanao, the military overran the Buliok complex (MILF command center after Camp Abubakar) in campaigns against kidnap-for-ransom groups. Because of MILF-KFRG atrocities, some P47 million worth of agricultural produce was destroyed and P130 million in infrastructure damaged.

Thus, the direct costs of renewed Mindanao war from April, 2000, to December, 2003, amounted to some P2.3 billion, as revealed in said briefing.

War’s social costs

More than body-counts and direct damage, war’s social costs were even greater.

Per DSWD figures, some one million persons were displaced/ rendered homeless by Estrada’s war policy starting in April, 2000. Due to crackdowns on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 200,000 more people were dislocated. That number increased in 2003 with additional 750,000 evacuees. From 2000 to 2004, therefore, 2,000,000 people became “internal refugees,” losing both homes and livelihood in Mindanao.

The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report records that “All-Out War” and ASG atrocities caused Mindanao investment growth to plunge from plus 17% to minus 5% in 2000-2001, resulting in its negative growth. Considering both explicit and implicit economic losses, OPAPP reported that from 1975 to 2002, losses in Mindanao ranged from P5 to P10 billion annually, which totals an astronomical P135 to P270 billion for 27 years!! 

DO FILIPINOS WANT WAR OR PEACE?

(Please revisit our Bulletin columns of 17 and 24 September 2006; 25 November and 02 December 2007; and 10 and 17 August 2008.)

Abangan. Next, the NDF-NPA.

Please send any comments to fvr@rpdev.org. Copies of articles are available at www.rpdev.org.