Because the number of political subdivisions in every level is not exactly ten and the number of voters in any given political subdivision is not exactly that stated in the corresponding electoral unit, one might be tempted to peremptorily dismiss the system as unworkable. Concededly, there are not always, for instance, ten barangays in every bayan (municipality of city district), and there are not exactly 10,000 voters in every barangay. This apparent incongruity is cured by a method of adhesion and spilling over to maintain the required number of votes and units at each level. More specifically, any excess in the number of voters or electoral units can spill over to other electoral units of the same level in a contiguous or nearby political subdivision lacking the required number. Conversely, any deficiency in the number of voters or electoral units in any particular level can be completed by adhesion to excess but incomplete number of voters or units of the same level in any contiguous or nearby political subdivision, just like the way atoms release or capture electrons to maintain an electro-magnetic equilibrium with their protons.

Parenthetically, a political subdivision is different from an electoral unit. The former is the territory where a candidate runs for public office, while the latter is where the votes are cast, counted and canvassed. The electoral unit may not always be able to cover the entire political subdivision, or at times may even be larger than the latter, but as close as possible, it tries to approximate the electoral size of the political subdivision. That is why the system adhered to and adopts the nomenclature of the political subdivisions. The idea is to maintain the fixed number of votes at every level, thereby "locking" the system against any addition or subtraction of votes at all levels.

The exponential system starts with the basic electoral unit, the Angkan, which corresponds to the basic social unit, the family. Ten voters constitute one Angkan. Each member of the Angkan must personally know all the others by reason of their being members of the same family, clan, immediate neighborhood or barrio, in that preferential order. Domicile (the place where a person stays or lives permanently and to which he, wherever he may be and no matter how long, has the intention to return) and not mere residence, should be the basis for voter registration under this system because that is where he is better known and where his heart is.

The Angkan is where the voting takes place, so voters will never be at a loss looking for their precincts. On election day, a sort of family reunion takes place at a designated ancestral home or house of one of the Angkan members. Each Angkan will be provided with ten (and only ten) ballots and one set of an election return. Each Angkan member in turn will be entitled to one, and only one ballot which he fills out in secret and casts within a specified hour. After all the ballots are cast, the votes are counted and tallied by the voters themselves. The votes cast, uncast or spoiled must add up to ten (10), no more no less. The election return shall be certified to be correct and signed by at least a majority of six of the ten members. Four of the members are then, and only then, chosen by raffle: The first shall represent the Angkan at the next higher level (Sitio) and submit forthwith to the Sitio the election return together with the ballots at a designated place and time on election day; the second shall act at secretary and official custodian of all Angkan electoral documents; and, the third and fourth thus chosen, shall act as secret observers who will mingle with the public at the Sitio to observe whether or not the genuine electoral return is the one submitted and counted, and to report the results of the Sitio canvassing to the Angkan through its secretary. The results in both levels insofar as the lower level is involved should tally. Any discrepancy between the electoral return and the certificate of canvass of the Sitio should be immediately reported and promptly rectified. This feedback mechanism provides an important link between the two levels (and all higher levels to their lower units) to make the system self-correcting.

At the Sitio level, the ten Angkan representatives, now acting as Sitio members, examine and verify the genuineness and authenticity of the electoral returns submitted to it. (Here, party watchers and counsel can start to appear.) If satisfied, the Sitio members proceed to count and tally all the votes cast, uncast or spoiled in the 10 Angkan units which votes must now add up to 100, no more no less. The tally and results are reflected in a Sitio certificate of canvass, to be signed by at least six (6) of the ten (10) Sitio members. The certificate of canvass shall be supported by the ten election returns that were submitted by the Angkan units. Then, and only then, four Sitio members are chosen by raffle: The first, to represent the Sitio at the Barrio level and to submit forthwith the Sitio certificate of canvass together with the supporting election returns of the ten Angkan units to the Barrio; the second, to act as Sitio secretary who will take custody of all Sitio electoral documents; and, the third and fourth, to serve as secret observers at the Barrio to see to it that the genuine Sitio certificate of canvass is the one submitted and counted thereat, and together with the representative, to report back the results of the Barrio canvassing to the Sitio, through the secretary who verifies whether or not the results at the higher level tally with those of the Sitio insofar as the latter is concerned.

The same procedure is followed at the Barrio level, and repeated at every succeeding higher level, up to the Sambayanan level. At each level, the following requisites must be met:

1. The total number of votes cast, uncast or spoiled must add up to not more and not less than the number of votes corresponding to that level (except at the last level, Sambayanan, where the fixed number of votes cannot be attained because the total number of registered voters is much less.)

2. Each lower level must be represented by one member and there must be no more than ten (10) nor less than ten (10) members;

3. The tally and results of the canvass are reflected in a certificate of canvass which must be signed by at least six (6) of the ten (10) members, a copy of which must also be furnished to each member who delivers the same to the secretary of the lower unit for verification;

4. The original certificate of canvass must be supported by ten original certificates of canvass submitted by the lower level.

Residual votes in electoral units which were completed as a result of adhesion or spilling over will, of course, be credited in favor of candidates from whose political subdivisions the deficiency of voters or electoral units emanated or whose political subdivisions created the excess, even though the votes were counted or canvassed in an electoral unit outside of their political subdivisions.

Under this system, "dagdag-bawas" cannot prosper because there can neither be more nor less than the fixed number of votes in each level, except the last (Sambayanan). Thus no additional votes can be inserted and no subtracted votes can be removed without disrupting the exponential system. Any disruption would immediately be noticed and the level immediately pinpointed. Substitution or switching of electoral returns or certificates of canvass through connivance with representatives would be very difficult because: (1) genuine certificates of canvass are supported by ten lower certificates of canvass, each being signed by at least six (6) members or a total of a least sixty (60) signatories at any given level; (2) there are 10 representatives and 20 secret observers who will report the substitution or switching to their respective unit secretaries who in turn will report the matter to the authorities; (3) representatives are not known beforehand because they are chosen by raffle only after the canvassing is completed in their respective electoral units; and once chosen, are required to proceed forthwith to the next higher level to submit the electoral documents. To substitute or switch election returns or certificates of canvass, one has to forge 60 signatures, connive with ten representatives, and bribe, force or intimidate no less than 20 observers present at any given level. One would be foolish to risk all that. The odds are just too great.

"Ghost voters" literally cannot appear because everyone knows each other at the Angkan level where the voting takes place. "Ghost electoral units" also cannot sprout suddenly and from nowhere because there are only ten electoral units at every level and each of these is verified to be in actual existence, genuine and accounted for before each election. Besides, there are just too many functionaries involved at every level; any irregularity can easily be noticed. For one, these "ghosts" should at least be represented by one natural person at any given level. How many would dare to openly represent a "ghost" and to risk going to jail for it?

"Flying voters" would not have the time to "fly" from one Angkan to another because voting time in the Angkan will be limited to, and closed in, one (1) hour as there are only ten voters. Besides, double or multiple registration of voters can easily be crosschecked by computers, specially if an identification system based on the voter’s fingerprint (or more preferably his DHA) is put in place.

Whether counting is done manually or by computers, the system mathematically simplifies and democratizes the election process. It empowers the voters themselves to count their votes at the first level and, through their representatives, are able to canvass and safeguard the results of an election in a relatively foolproof manner not only in the local levels but also up to the national level. The Comelec and its representatives will, of course, still be there to guide, assist and administer the election law and to proclaim the winners. If adopted, the system will at last usher in a new era of clean, honest and orderly elections, truly expressive of the will and choice of the electorate.

The crucial question though is: Will it be adopted?