Both the Bangkok Post and The Nation invested many column inches of front page space last month to the resignation of Somkid Jatusripitak as chief of a newly-created government office established to explain the "sufficiency economy" to the international community. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, who made the appointment, accepted the resignation and abolished the office, making a replacement unnecessary.

The appointment had come as a surprise. Somkid had served Thaksin’s government as commerce minister, finance minister, and deputy prime minister, and was the second highest official in Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party. Anti-Thaksin groups denounced him as the architect of Thaksinomics and its expensive populist projects that they decried as fiscally irresponsible.

Some political analysts initially saw the Surayud gambit as a brilliant, double-bladed blow against Thai Rak Thai. Offering Somkid a high profile post seemed like a gesture of reconciliation that might win over some TRT partisans. At the same time, who better to discredit the creed of Thaksinomics than the disillusioned author who had renounced the faith?

But the appointment was as unwelcome, as it was unexpected, to the political groups arrayed against Thaksin. They noted how the ultra-capitalist practices of Thaksinomics clashed with the King’s conception of the sufficiency economy and ridiculed the appointment of Somkid as the apostle who would preach it to the international community. They also recalled that Somkid still had to explain his reported role in alleged anomalies related to a rubber sapling procurement project.

Somkid disowned Thaksinomics, claimed that he stayed in Thaksin’s government only to help protect the economy, and pointed out that Thaksin had relieved him of his government posts before the coup. But unable to contain the opposition to his appointment, Somkid tendered his resignation less than a week after accepting the position of special economic envoy.

In the statement he made to the media on his resignation, Somkid stressed three points: 1) the Prime Minister exerted no pressure on him to resign; 2) holding on to the post would create problems for the government and make national reconciliation more difficult; and, 3) he resigned "for the good of the country."

Obtaining independent confirmation that Somkid resigned without any pressure from Surayud, would perhaps be possible, but difficult; Surayud would not want to admit forcing Somkid’s resignation, even if that had been the case. It would be even more difficult to dispute the motivation that Somkid professed for deciding to relinquish the short-lived appointment.

Granting that resignation might allow Somkid to reap political benefits, it was still a gracious gesture. I cannot recall, and neither can the friends I consulted, any high level bureaucrat or politician in the Philippines resigning "for the good of the country."

We have seen cases, few and far between, of executive officials and some politicians resigning on a matter of principle. The Hyatt 10 resignations provided the most recent example. But there was no one asking them to resign; indeed, the pressure on them was to stay on with an administration they believed they could no longer trust and respect.

Citizen pressure on public officials to resign has proven singularly unsuccessful in the Philippines. Consider the Comelec officials, starting from Luz Tangcangco to Ben Abalos, who came under fire, not just from the public, but also from the Senate and the Supreme Court, but still managed to cling to their appointments. The Somkid case thus compels reflection on the contrast between the Thai and the Philippine political culture.

Does the Buddhist concept of merit-making and reincarnation make a difference? If there is a chance that a politician may come back to compete in politics again, would it not be prudent to do good deeds that would contribute to better prospects in a future contest in another lifetime? The Christian conception of the after-life precludes any return engagements.

Academics also suggest that Thailand, like Japan, where officials who fail in a task feel compelled to resign, operates on a "shame" culture. Preserving face in the community is of utmost importance and transcends most other considerations.

Perhaps, the tradition of royal rule has also reinforced this value by cultivating among people of stature the sense of noblesse oblige. The people who have benefited from superior breeding, education and training and must, therefore, know better, must also act according to an accepted code of behavior. That code prohibits self-promotion and the insistence on staying where one was not wanted.

Never subjected to direct colonial rule, Thailand has also enjoyed a longer history as a national community. Perhaps, Thailand has developed a stronger sense of nationhood, so that the phrase "good of the country" means more than a rhetorical flourish in political speeches.

Perhaps, this is all pop sociology. But if it has any substance at all, it suggests that Thai public officials and politicians follow religious precepts more seriously, possess a stronger sense of personal honor and noblesse, and have a deeper commitment to the national welfare. What does this say about their Filipino counterparts?